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Abstract
Using a hedonic wage-amenity model, this paper examines the valuation of medical inputs into the production of
health. The data used in this study include the incomes, demographics and measures of human capital for
households in eastern North Carolina with county level medical input supply. These data allow an estimate of the
marginal value of medical care inputs such as the physician to population ratio and the availability of specialized
services in an area of the country where the lack of available medical care has been of particular concern to policy
makers. Our results indicate that while health care inputs are not a significant determinant of earnings overall, they
are important in counties that have been designated as medically underserved. In underserved counties each
additional physician per 10,000 individuals in the county decreases earnings by about 11.6%. This suggests that
physicians act as an amenity and workers are willing to accept lower wages to locate in counties with a higher
physician to population ratio. # 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
The assumption underlying the hedonic wage model
is that workers prefer jobs with more pleasant working
conditions. The greater supply of workers for pleasant
jobs will lower the wage in these jobs and, in equili-
brium, the dierence in wages between two jobs will
reflect the workers’ marginal valuation of the dierence
in working conditions. Firms have dierent isoprofit
curves and thus their willingness to provide pleasant or
productivity enhancing job characteristics will vary.
Similarly, dierent workers have dierent preferences
and there is a non-random sorting of workers and
firms. If working conditions are uncorrelated with pro-
ductivities, firms with a low cost of producing pleasant
conditions will tend to be matched with workers with
a stronger preference for these conditions, while firms
with a high cost of producing pleasant conditions will
tend to attract workers with a lower preference for
these characteristics. Thus, since the resulting hedonic
wage function is an envelope of isoprofit and iso-utility
curves the resulting compensating dierential reflects
the preferences of the marginal worker and the mar-
ginal eect on firm profit.
One practical application of this model is the valua-
tion of the environmental and social amenities that
vary across regions. This paper examines the valuation
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of inputs into the production of health. Inputs into
health production, such as environmental health ame-
nities and the availability of medical care services, will
tend to attract workers and firms, due to the enhance-
ment of labor productivity and the amenity value to
consumers and either increase or decrease wages,
depending on the relative size of the two eects. If the
value of the marginal product of the amenity is greater
than the willingness to pay for the amenity, then wages
will rise; and vice versa.
Hospital services, nursing home services and other
medical services are quasi-public goods. Non-profit
health care enterprises may arise where a sucient
minority of voters is dissatisfied with the market’s and
government’s level of provision (Weisbrod, 1975,
1988). High quality hospitals and doctors may also
enhance a community’s sense of pride and well being.
They may indirectly provide benefits to local business
by improving labor productivity. In addition, excess
hospital capacity provides insurance for the currently
healthy citizens in that a bed will be available should
they need one. Thus, while these components of the
benefits of medical care are likely to be rather signifi-
cant, it is not likely that their economic value will be
fully reflected in market prices.
To the extent that managed care has de-emphasized
the use of physicians and hospitals and tends to use
more nurse practitioners and physician assistants the
public good component of medical care may have
diminished. In addition, physicians serve rural areas by
doing rotations into outlying areas rather than living
in them and better roads, helicopter ambulances and
telemedicine all tend to reduce the value of physicians
and hospitals which are located in the local county.
The implication is that while traditional medical inputs
may still be important, their contribution is not as
great as they were prior to the rise of managed care
and the reduced transportation costs. Thus, the results
found in this paper using data from the early 1990s are
likely to find a smaller impact of medical care inputs
than a study using older data. We test for these chan-
ging eects below by splitting our data into two time
periods and examining dierences.
There have been relatively few hedonic wage studies
that considered health amenities. Blomquist et al.
(1988) estimate housing and wage hedonic equations in
the context of an urban quality of life study and find
that health-related environmental disamenities, such as
Superfund sites, are capitalized in both land and labor
markets. Clark and Kahn (1989), in the context of a
recreational fishing valuation study, find that, holding
constant housing prices, the number of physicians in
an urban area has no eect on wages. Gyourko and
Tracy (1991) find that the number of hospital beds is a
valued publicly provided good in the wage equation
but does not aect the housing price. These studies use
national, urban data.
This paper diers from previous research in two im-
portant ways. First, our data contain a broader range
of medical inputs than utilized in previous research
that may be considered as local amenities and those
that increase worker productivity. This will allow us to
examine the eects of omitting these variables. Also,
we focus on a particular problem with medical care
access: access to medical care in an underserved, rural
area (Goetz and Debertin, 1996)2. The data used in
this study include the incomes, demographics and
measures of human capital for over 3000 households
in eastern North Carolina with county level medical
care inputs. Using a hedonic wage model, these data
allow an estimate of the marginal value of medical
care inputs such as the physician to population ratio,
number and size of hospitals and the availability of
specialized services in an area of the country where the
lack of available health care has been of particular
concern to policy makers.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays
out the theory behind the hedonic wage model. We
then describe the data used in the paper and present
descriptive statistics. The fourth section presents our
results and conclusions follow in the final section.
Theory
Our modeling approach begins with utility and
health production functions, which are then integrated
into a hedonic model of wages and rents. We assume
individuals possess a utility function of the following
form:
u  uX,H,S  1
where u(.) is the utility function, X is a vector of mar-
ket goods, H is the housing commodity and S is indi-
vidual health status, measured as annual sick days.
Utility is increasing in the composite commodity, the
housing commodity and decreasing in sick days. Sick
days decrease utility by decreasing the number of days
spent engaged in utility producing activities.
Individual health status is endogenous and can be
produced according to the health production function:
S  sQ, M  2
where Q is a vector of medical care inputs priced in
markets, SQ < 0 and M is a vector of unpriced medi-
cal care inputs, SM < 0. In addition to the public good
2 The use of ‘underserved’ here refers to a need-based short-
age as defined by Lee and Jones (1993) and not necessarily an
economic shortage.
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nature of medical care mentioned above, a significant
portion of the full cost of medical care inputs, es-
pecially in underserved rural areas, is the unpriced
opportunity cost of travel time for access to medical
care. In this respect, access to medical care inputs is a
quasi-public good. The full costs of medical care inputs
are inversely related with access.
We integrate the health production function into a
hedonic model, which is based on the models of
Blomquist et al. (1988), Clark and Kahn (1989) and
Gyourko and Tracy (1991). These models are based on
the hedonic price models of Rosen (1974) and Roback
(1982). After substitution of (2) into (1), households
are assumed to possess indirect utility functions v(.) of
the form
vr,w,M  max uX,H,sQ,M 
s:t:w  PXX PQQ rH hS 3
where w is annual income, Pi are vectors of market
prices, i=X,Q and h is the opportunity cost of sick
days. Indirect utility is decreasing in the land rent,
increasing in income and medical inputs. Market prices
are assumed constant and suppressed for simplicity.
Business firms are assumed to possess production
functions of the form
X  XLÿ S,H  4
where X(.) is the production function, LÿS is the
labor input net sick days and H is the land input. The
capital input is suppressed for simplicity. Output is
increasing in the inputs. After substitution of (2) into
(4), business firms are assumed to possess indirect
profit functions of the form
Pr,w,M   max PXXLÿ sQ,M ,H  ÿ wLÿ rH 5
where P(.) is the indirect profit function which is
decreasing in r and w. Medical care inputs have a posi-
tive eect on profit by increasing the productivity of
the labor input. The output price, PX, is assumed con-
stant and suppressed in the indirect profit function for
simplicity.
The unpriced medical care inputs can become capita-
lized in both land and labor markets. To see this, con-
sider the graphical model in Fig. 1 of the indierence
and isoprofit curves in r,w space. With mobility in the
long run, household utility and firm profits will be
equalized across locations. Incomes and rents will be
determined in the markets after sorting among workers
and firms take place. The initial equilibrium, point a,
summarizes these prices. Improvements in medical care
inputs has a positive direct eect on rents and a nega-
tive direct eect on wages as workers enjoy higher uti-
lity levels, v2 > v1 and move to the counties with these
characteristics, equilibrium b. Profits for business firms
are also greater in the attractive locations; so, as firms
move to these areas land rents increase further.
Depending on the size of the productivity eect on
firm profits, wages may be negatively (equilibrium c )
or positively (equilibrium d ), aected by firm location
decisions3.
Solving the indirect utility function, Eq. (3) and
indirect profit function, Eq. (5), for r and w, equating
these functions and solving for equilibrium wage and
land rents, respectively, yields reduced form wage and
rent equations in which these prices depend entirely on
medical care inputs w ’=w(M), r ’=r(M) where w ’ and
r ’ are the equilibrium prices for homogeneous house-
holds.
Empirical specification
Our data contain no information on household
specific land rents or housing prices in which to
measure the hedonic price function. Therefore, we
assume that the equilibrium wage function includes a
measure of land rent in order to hold the eect of
housing markets on wages constant across locations.
The empirical specification of our model is
ln wi  bMi  ari  dKi  gNi  mi 6
where ln wi is the log of annual income for household
i. K is a vector of human capital and other demo-
graphic variables including education, experience and
its square, the number of children in the household
and dummy variables for race (2), gender, marital sta-
tus (2), year of survey (4) and full-time status. ri is the
average of the log housing value for individual i’s
county. As in typical hedonic wage models, local
characteristics, N, are controlled for with a series of
variables including local government per pupil expendi-
Fig. 1. The determination of wages and rents.
3 For an empirical example of the overall positive eect of
amenities on wages in the context of public infrastructure and
wages, see Dalenberg and Partridge (1997).
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ture and the rate of violent crime. Medical care ame-
nities (M ) potentially include such variables as hospital
beds, the per capita number of physicians and avail-
ability of specialty services4. Finally, m is a well-
behaved error term5.
The wage-amenity model can be used to estimate
non-market values for unpriced amenities. In this
paper we assume a log–linear functional form of the
model to be consistent with human capital theory
(Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1993). The coecient estimates,
therefore, can be interpreted as log wage dierentials,
or approximate percentage dierentials6. The focus of
this paper will be on the coecient vector b, which
will indicate the eect of various health care amenities
on household income.
The data
The household level data are from 1991 through
1995 annual telephone surveys of eastern North
Carolina households. The surveys used a random digit
dialing sampling scheme with response rates of at least
70% in each year. Our data do not contain infor-
mation on hours worked or hourly wages, rather the
interviewer asks individuals to place themselves in one
of eight income categories. The income categories (in
1995 dollars) are: less than $10,000 (10.5% of the
sample); between $10,001 and 15,000 (12.1% of the
sample); between $15,001 and 20,000 (12.6%); between
$20,001 and 25,000 (11.4%); between $25,001 and
30,000 (11.2%); between $30,001 and 50,000 (25.1%);
between $50,001 and 75,000 (12.3%); and greater than
$75,000 (4.8%). We omit those who did not list work-
ing as their primary activity, so that those who are
Table 2
Maximum likelihood estimates of earnings equations dependent variable: log of income group cutosa
Variable 1 2
Constant ÿ6.551 (0.637) ÿ7.551 (0.743)
Per capita physicians 0.007 (0.010) 0.014 (0.013)
Pediatric ICU hospital beds 0.002 (0.002) ÿ0.003 (0.003)
Underserved county – ÿ0.063 (0.030)
Underserved  physpop – ÿ0.123 (0.045)
Underserved  PICU Beds – 0.024 (0.009)
Log(housing value) 0.174 (0.054) 0.087 (0.066)
School 0.115 (0.005) 0.114 (0.005)
Experience 0.021 (0.002) 0.021 (0.002)
Experience2/100 ÿ0.039 (0.004) ÿ0.038 (0.004)
Black ÿ0.291 (0.023) ÿ0.294 (0.023)
Other Race ÿ0.129 (0.044) ÿ0.127 (0.045)
Female ÿ0.071 (0.019) ÿ0.072 (0.019)
Married 0.434 (0.028) 0.439 (0.028)
Divorced, separated or widowed ÿ0.157 (0.031) ÿ0.156 (0.031)
Children 0.039 (0.008) 0.040 (0.008)
Work full-time 0.178 (0.020) 0.176 (0.020)
Crime rate ÿ0.008 (0.006) 0.014 (0.009)
Per pupil expenditures ÿ0.055 (0.042) ÿ0.070 (0.044)
1992 ÿ0.109 (0.030) ÿ0.107 (0.030)
1993 ÿ0.105 (0.030) ÿ0.103 (0.030)
1994 ÿ0.059 (0.030) ÿ0.058 (0.030)
1995 0.000 (0.029) 0.000 (0.029)
Sample size 3369 3369
Sigma 0.509 (0.007) 0.508 (0.007)
Log-likelihood ÿ5730.052 ÿ5719.09
w 2 for joint significance of physicians and beds 1.154 23.976
a Results are maximum likelihood estimates of the grouped data model where the dependent variable is the log of the income
group cutos. Standard errors in parentheses.  indicates significance at the 5% level.
4 Our final specification of Eq. (6) includes per capita phys-
icians and the number of pediatric intensive care beds in the
county.
5 We also included environmental amenity variables such as
the natural log of pounds of hazardous waste generated by
county or distance to the nearest major beach. None of these
variables, however, were significantly dierent from zero in
any of the model specifications.
6 The coecients are converted to percentage changes by
the formula (ebÿ1)  100, where b is the coecient estimate.
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enrolled in school and working or who are not in the
labor force are deleted from the sample. The sample
yields observations on 3369 households in the 41 coun-
ties that make up eastern North Carolina7.
Table 1 provides variable descriptions and means of
all variables used in the final wage-amenity models. On
average there are 1.23 physicians per 10,000 individuals
in the counties and there are almost 5 pediatric ICU
beds in each county. About 30% of the sample are
non-white and almost 60% are currently married.
Estimation results
Since the income data is reported only by large cat-
egories, ordinary least squares regression estimates,
employing the midpoints of the categories, will be
biased (Stewart, 1983). Therefore, we use the maxi-
mum likelihood interval estimates from the
GROUPED data command in LIMDEP (Greene,
1995) to obtain unbiased coecient estimates. Table 2
displays the maximum likelihood estimates. Although
the main focus of the paper is the impact of medical
care inputs on earnings, the eect of the other indepen-
dent variables are of interest. Schooling and experience
are important determinants of earnings as these are the
main measures of human capital in our model. Each
year of schooling adds about 12% to family income.
As is typical for an earnings equation, experience
increases earnings at a decreasing rate. After control-
ling for other measurable characteristics, blacks and
females earn substantially less than white males (about
25 and 7% respectively)8. This is a larger wage dier-
ence than obtained from most studies examining the
impact of race on the entire labor market (Hirsch and
Macpherson, 1994). Higher earnings are associated
with marriage consistent with previous literature, how-
ever, single workers are estimated to earn more than
previously married individuals. This later result is con-
trary to previous literature (Korenmen and Neumark,
1991). There is also a wage dierential for the presence
of children, which may capture investments in human
capital. Earnings are highest in 1991 (the omitted year)
and are lowest in 1992 and 1993, but return to their
1991 levels by 1995.
The wage-amenity specification in column 1 of Table
2 includes the per capita physician ratio and the num-
ber of pediatric intensive care unit beds. With the
other variables held constant, both of these medical
care inputs have an insignificant eect on earnings.
The critical value for the w 2 test of joint significance
for these two variables is 1.154 which implies that they
are not jointly significant.
These findings imply that the health care inputs are
not an important determinant of earnings. An alterna-
tive, though unlikely, explanation is that the pro-
ductivity eect just osets the amenity eect of health
care inputs and thus the net eect is zero. Since eastern
North Carolina has been singled out as a ‘medically
underserved’ area of the county, this finding is signifi-
cant. Before we conclude that health care inputs do
not matter, however, we explore the underserved area
eects a little more closely. Not all counties in this
area are medically underserved. A number of counties
have been designated as Health Professional Shortage
Areas (HPSAs). A ratio of one primary care physician
per 3500 people is used to designate a HPSA (Project
East, 1993). Appendix Table 4 indicates that 18 of the
41 counties in the region have been designated as
medically underserved.
Column 2 of Table 2 displays the results of including
a dummy variable for a medically underserved county
and the eects of interacting this variable with the health
care inputs. The results show that while there appears to
be no overall eect of health care inputs on earnings,
there is a rather large eect in counties that have been
deemed medically underserved. The critical value for the
w 2 test of joint significance for the medical inputs and
the two interaction terms is 23.98, which is highly sig-
nificant. Workers in counties that are underserved
receive earnings about 6% lower than workers in other
counties, all things equal. This is likely capturing the
relatively worse economic conditions in these counties
(note that the coecient on the log housing value
decreases and is no longer significant).
The coecients on the interaction terms indicate
that medical inputs are important determinants of
earnings in underserved areas. The eect of physicians
is significantly negative in underserved areas suggesting
that the amenity component of physicians overwhelms
any productivity eect. Each additional physician per
10,000 individuals in the county decreases earnings by
about 10.3% (0.014ÿ0.123=ÿ0.109 log points), hold-
ing all other variables constant. Pediatric ICU beds,
on the other hand, are estimated to be a productivity
enhancing characteristic. Each additional pediatric
ICU bed is estimated to increase earnings by about
2.1% (ÿ0.003+0.024=0.021 log points). A priori, one
might expect the presence of a pediatric ICU to appear
as only an amenity since it is unlikely that this medical
service could directly aect worker productivity. It
may be, however, that this variable rather than indicat-
ing the direct eect of a pediatric ICU is capturing
other characteristics of a hospital. That is, for example,
hospitals with higher quality facilities or doctors is
likely to be considered a productivity-enhancing
7 Table 4 provides a list of these counties as well as descrip-
tive information about each county.
8 The log point dierence of ÿ0.291 is converted into a per-
centage dierence by (eÿ0.291ÿ1)  100=ÿ25.2%.
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characteristic and these hospitals also are likely to pro-
vide pediatric ICU care.
A potential problem with our model specification is
that doctors and hospital beds may be endogenous.
Doctors and hospitals may be attracted to areas where
wages are higher and thus treating them as exogenous
may lead to biased estimates of the eects of these
variables on earnings. We test for the endogeneity of
physicians and beds using the technique of Blundell
and Smith (1986) adapted to the interval regression
and find no evidence for endogeneity. We first estimate
a county level model for physician and bed location.
This model is identified using county-level character-
istics. These models have R2 values greater than 0.70
for both models. We then include the residuals from
these models in the individual income equation. A sig-
nificant coecient on this residual would lead one to
conclude that there is evidence of endogeneity bias.
The coecients on the residuals are not significantly
dierent from zero (asymptotic t-values=0.86, 0.23).
Thus, these results suggest that there is no evidence of
endogeneity and estimating the Grouped data model
including physicians and beds on the right-hand-side
will not lead to biased coecient estimates.
Wage-amenity models including other medical care
inputs as alternative independent variables performed
less well than the specification shown in Table 2. For
example, including such variables as the number of pri-
mary care physicians, the number of emergency rooms,
the presence of an open heart surgery unit, or a
dummy variable equal to one if the county had at least
one open heart unit, pediatric intensive care unit, or
angioplasty unit were generally insignificant in the
earnings equations. This suggests that while previous
studies examining the hedonic value of medical care
inputs may not have had access to detailed health care
input variables, it appears that their results are not
biased by these omissions9.
Table 3 displays specifications run separately for
whites and nonwhites. There are surprisingly large
dierences in the eects of medical care inputs between
the white and nonwhite population. The results for
whites are similar to those for the population. Separate
estimates for nonwhites indicate that while there is not
a distinct underserved county eect, the eect of phys-
icians is positive and significant. Each additional phys-
ician per 10,000 individuals in the county increases
nonwhite family income by about 5%, while the eect
for white families is negative and only appears in
underserved counties. Also, according to the likeli-
hood-ratio test, the vector of coecients for whites is
significantly dierent from the coecient vector for
nonwhites (w 2=111.91[15 d.f.]).
While the small sample size for nonwhites
(n= 1000) make firm conclusions dicult, these find-
ings suggest that medical inputs have a substantially
larger productivity enhancing eect for nonwhites than
for whites. This finding is consistent with empirical
findings on the production of health which concludes
that the marginal product of medical care inputs on in-
dividual health are typically much stronger for blacks
than for whites (Corman et al., 1987; Hadley 1988;
Folland et al., 1997). Since the marginal product of
medical care is higher for blacks than whites, it follows
that the marginal impact of medical care inputs on
earnings will be higher for blacks as well. If this were
the case, however, one may expect that this eect
would be stronger in underserved areas. We do not see
this. An alternative explanation could be that the pro-
ductivity eects are similar, but whites place a higher
value on medical care amenities than non-whites.
Whatever the explanation, it is clear from these results
that there are distinct dierences in the way medical
inputs aect white and nonwhite individuals.
Conclusions
This paper is concerned with the eects of medical
care inputs on primarily rural household incomes.
Because of the quasi-public good nature of medical
care inputs, it is dicult to measure the full price or
value of these inputs. The approach taken here is to
estimate a hedonic wage function, which relates the
earnings of workers to a particular labor market or
local area characteristics. Medical care inputs are
Table 3
Separate eects by racea
Variable White Nonwhite
Per capita physicians 0.007 (0.016) 0.050 (0.027)
Pediatric ICU hospital beds ÿ0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.006)
Underserved county ÿ0.054 (0.037) ÿ0.061 (0.057)
Underserved  physpop ÿ0.124 (0.052) ÿ0.052 (0.114)
Underserved  PICU beds 0.025 (0.010) ÿ0.004 (0.024)
a Shown are the coecients on health inputs estimated sep-
arately by race. Other than the variables shown, other vari-
ables included in the regression are the same as in Table 2
with the exception of the race dummies.  indicates the coe-
cient is significant at the 5% level.
9 We also examined the possibility that the public good
component of medical care may have diminished over the
period due to the rise of managed care and lowered transpor-
tation costs. If large changes occurred over the period, we
should find large dierences between the early years of the
sample and the later years. We estimated separate models for
the years 1991–1992 and the years 1993–1995. We find that
there is no evidence for change over the period. The coe-
cient estimates are virtually identical for both sub-periods.
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found to have an insignificant eect on earnings for
the region as a whole, but there are significant eects
in counties that have been designated as medically
underserved. The physician to population ratio in
medically underserved counties is found to be a utility
enhancing characteristic. Each physician per 10,000 in-
dividuals in the population decreases earnings by
about 12%. The number of pediatric intensive care
beds, however, appears as a small productivity-enhan-
cing characteristic. This variable is likely capturing an
overall prestige value of the hospital. We also find evi-
dence that the productivity component of health care
inputs is stronger for blacks than for whites.
Our results are suggestive for a number of reasons.
First, our study is the first to include more highly
detailed controls for medical care inputs, allowing us
to probe deeper into the eect of medical care inputs
on incomes. It appears that previous studies including
only limited health care inputs are not seriously biased.
Second, our study is the first to focus on a rural area
in which policy makers have been concerned with the
underprovision of medical services10. It appears that
there are distinct dierences between the eects of
medical inputs in areas that are deemed medically
underserved. The results suggest that these services are
highly valued by firms and workers in the region and
have policy implications for the economic development
of poor, rural regions. For example, if firms value
medical care inputs when they make location decisions
and poor areas are underserved in terms of inputs, this
puts a binding constraint on the economic develop-
ment of the poor region.
A common finding in the health production litera-
ture is that while the marginal product of health care
is relatively low for the population as a whole, it is sig-
nificantly larger for certain subgroups (Hadley, 1982,
1988). Our findings are consistent with this conclusion.
Previous studies examining the impact of physician
inputs on wages typically find that they are negatively
correlated (Gyourko and Tracy, 1991). Our finding
that there is a positive wage eect of physicians for
blacks suggests that there is a strong productivity eect
for this group of workers, consistent with the marginal
product of health care being relatively large for this
group of workers.
These results also suggest avenues for further
research. Most wage-amenity models employ urban
data while our data is for a rural region. Since there
are significant concerns about the rural location de-
cisions for physicians, models that include both urban
and rural households and the definitions of medically
underserved regions may provide insights about the
migration of households and firms in pursuit of phys-
icians. Future wage-amenity models that include medi-
cal care inputs could also include measures of
environmental health amenities in order to test for the
substitutability of averting behavior and medical care.
Finally, much research has determined that the valua-
tion of amenities is determined in both labor and land
markets. Our wage-amenity models include a proxy
Table 4
Counties included in surveya
County 1990 Population Observations Underserved
Beaufort 42,283 76 no
Bertie 20,388 27 yes
Bladen 28,663 45 yes
Brunswick 50,985 55 no
Camden 5904 14 no
Carteret 52,553 85 no
Chowan 13,506 27 no
Columbus 49,587 79 yes
Craven 81,613 158 no
Cumberland 274,713 390 yes
Currituck 13,736 22 no
Dare 22,746 33 no
Duplin 39,995 80 yes
Edgecombe 56,692 117 yes
Gates 9305 16 yes
Greene 15,385 45 yes
Halifax 55,516 83 no
Harnett 67,833 116 no
Hertford 22,523 34 no
Hoke 22,856 41 yes
Hyde 5411 5 yes
Johnston 81,306 142 no
Jones 9414 10 yes
Lenoir 57,274 103 no
Martin 25,078 45 yes
Nash 76,677 109 no
New Hanover 120,284 217 no
Northampton 20,798 31 yes
Onslow 149,838 176 yes
Pamlico 11,368 20 no
Pasquotank 31,298 50 no
Pender 28,855 59 yes
Perquimans 10,447 18 no
Pitt 108,480 229 no
Robeson 105,170 165 yes
Sampson 47,297 81 no
Scotland 33,763 42 no
Tyrrell 3856 3 yes
Washington 13,997 27 yes
Wayne 104,666 181 no
Wilson 66,061 113 no
Total
2,060,110 3369
a Populations are from the 1990 Census of Population and
Housing. A county is underserved if there are fewer than one
primary care physician per 3500 individuals.
10 See, for example, Project EAST Profiles, a publication of
East Carolina University, September 1993.
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variable for the housing market. Future research
should employ a multi-market approach, if data
allows, to determine the full eect of medical care
inputs on quality of life.
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